Florida Law Review
Volume 70

Issue 6

Article 6

October 2019

Addressing Due Process Concerns: Evaluating Proposals for Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform
Kelly Milliron

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Kelly Milliron, Addressing Due Process Concerns: Evaluating Proposals for Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform,
70 Fla. L. Rev. 1379 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Milliron: Addressing Due Process Concerns: Evaluating Proposals for Civil A

ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS: EVALUATING
PROPOSALS FOR CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE REFORM
Kelly Milliron*
Abstract
Civil asset forfeiture compromises criminal due process protections
for the sake of allowing the government to take property from citizens
and pocket the profits. Within the last decade, several news outlets have
reported instances where law enforcement agencies took property from
citizens—without arresting or convicting them—and spent the proceeds
from seized cash, homes, or vehicles on their own agencies. Because the
government is often only required to prove that the property was
associated with criminal activity by a preponderance of the evidence,
many citizens are left without the resources or ability to defend their
property, even when they are innocent. As a national movement builds
toward challenging and reforming civil forfeiture laws, this Note
evaluates existing reforms as implemented in some states and as proposed
to state legislatures in others. This Note explores the viability of four
major proposals for civil forfeiture reform. Without abolishing civil
forfeiture altogether, these proposals could enhance due process
protection for individuals fighting forfeitures. These proposals could also
prevent the government from using civil forfeiture to make a profit rather
than to achieve civil forfeiture’s original purpose: compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
At 3:20 a.m., a police officer stopped a vehicle for speeding and
following another vehicle too closely.1 During the stop, the driver
consented to a search of his vehicle and the officer found a safe in the
trunk.2 The driver said the safe belonged to his mother and contained
money, but the passenger offered a different explanation. Because of this
discrepancy, the officer acquired a warrant.3 Upon opening the safe, the
officer discovered $201,000 and a bill of sale for a home in
Pennsylvania.4 Suspecting that the driver obtained the money through
drug sales, the officer confiscated the cash.5
The scenario above represents the facts from $201,100.00 United
States Currency v. State,6 where law enforcement successfully executed
a civil forfeiture.7 The court in that case held that the government met its
burden to show sufficient circumstantial evidence that the money
constituted contraband.8 Additionally, the court held that the driver’s
mother, who asserted that she qualified as the innocent owner of the
property, failed to demonstrate that she had a proprietary interest in the
money before or during the act giving rise to the forfeiture.9 The driver’s
mother stated that she received the money when she sold her home
several years prior and that she kept the money in a safe.10 Furthermore,
she claimed her son transported the money back to Texas so she could
purchase a home for him and his partner.11 And yet, the driver’s mother

1. $201,100.00 U.S. Currency v. State, No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 WL 4312536 *1, *1
(Tex. App. July 16, 2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. No. 09-14-00478-CV, 2015 WL 4312536 (Tex. App. July 16, 2016).
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id. at *2.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id.
11. Id. at *1.
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still failed to prove she was an innocent owner of the property.12 As a
result, she lost over $200,000 without ever being present.
This scenario provides a classic example of how a civil forfeiture
proceeding begins. Civil forfeiture typically occurs when a law
enforcement officer seizes an individual’s property because she has
probable cause to believe an individual has committed a crime, and as a
result, she confiscates the property associated with the crime.13 A civil
forfeiture action primarily rests on the legal fiction that the property itself
is the offender.14 The government brings an action against the property
and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property was
used to commit or facilitate a crime.15
In response, the owner of the property may assert an “innocent
ownership” affirmative defense.16 This defense requires the owner to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that at the time the illegal
conduct took place, the owner did not know of the conduct; or (2) that
upon learning of the illegal conduct, the owner did all that could be
reasonably expected under the circumstances to terminate such use of the
property.17 If the owner is unable to meet this requirement, the
government will keep the seized property.18 The government may also
confiscate property through criminal forfeiture, which occurs when an
individual is convicted of a crime and the government takes any property
or “ill-gotten gains” tied to the criminal activity.19 Civil and criminal
forfeiture proceedings may be brought in tandem in an attempt to ensure
that the government successfully acquires a defendant’s property even if
the prosecutor fails to secure a conviction.20
The driver’s mother in $201,100.00 attempted to bring the case to the
Supreme Court of the United States, but the Court denied certiorari
because she failed to properly preserve her due process argument.21
However, in a statement regarding the denial, Justice Thomas questioned
whether modern civil forfeiture practices remain justified by their
historical roots.22 In his statement, Justice Thomas touched on some of
12. Id. at *4.
13. See Kenneth Kandaras, Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need to Guarantee
a Prompt Trial, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 195, 195–96 (1981); see also Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 604 (1993) (providing an example of the government confiscating property associated
with the crime).
14. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2012).
16. Id. § 983(d).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 983(a)(1)(F).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2012).
20. Janeice T. Martin, Note, Final Jeopardy: Merging the Civil and Criminal Rounds in the
Punishment Game, 46 FLA. L. REV. 661, 661 (1994).
21. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017) (statement on the denial of certiorari).
22. Id.
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the issues that have plagued the continually changing practice and
reformation of civil forfeiture.23 Specifically, Justice Thomas noted how
civil forfeiture lacks certain procedural protections compared to criminal
law, that civil forfeiture proceedings have become highly profitable for
law enforcement agencies, and that civil forfeiture frequently targets the
poor or other groups who are incapable of adequately defending their
property.24 Most crucially, Justice Thomas discussed how modern
forfeiture laws have potentially expanded beyond the scope of their
historical justifications and how it is questionable if the historical
practices justify forfeiture actions proceeding civilly at all.25
Part I of this Note will explore the complex and turbulent history of
civil forfeiture law, which has led to concerns over the government’s use
of civil forfeiture as a powerful tool for profit. In Part II, this Note will
examine legislative actions since 2000 that signal the potential for change
in civil forfeiture law. Part III of this Note will then evaluate the major
solutions that have been proposed to address the due process concerns
stemming from civil forfeiture and analyze the arguments behind each
solution.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL FORFEITURE
The United States’ civil forfeiture roots extend deep into English
common law.26 Historically, if property caused a person’s death, the
property could be forfeited to the Crown.27 When a man died, the Crown
brought suit against the object that caused his death. Because the object
was to be given to God—and because the Crown stepped in on behalf of
God—the object would be deposited with the Crown for the Crown’s
use.28 The forfeited property would then be spent for the good of the
King’s soul.29 Although many characteristics of forfeiture as it existed
under English common law remain relics of the past, modern forfeiture
23. Id. at 848 (“This system—where police can seize property with limited judicial
oversight and retain it for their own use—has led to egregious and well-chronicled abuses.”).
24. Id. at 847–48 (“Civil proceedings often lack certain procedural protections that
accompany criminal proceedings, such as the right to a jury trial and a heightened standard of
proof.”).
25. Id. at 849 (“[I]t is unclear whether courts historically permitted forfeiture actions to
proceed civilly in all respects. Some of this Court's early cases suggested that forfeiture actions
were in the nature of criminal proceedings.”).
26. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993); United States v. U.S. Coin &
Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1971); United States v. One 1988 Ford Mustang, 728 F. Supp.
495, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
27. See One 1988 Ford Mustang, 728 F. Supp. at 498; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 27 (Paulo J. S. Pereira & Diego M. Beltran eds. 2011) (1881) (describing an
example where a man fell from a ship, the ship’s motion caused the man’s death, and the ship
was the guilty vehicle subject to forfeiture).
28. HOLMES, supra note 27, at 25–26.
29. Id.
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is still premised on the legal fiction that inanimate objects themselves can
be guilty of wrongdoing.30 In colonial America, forfeiture actions were
commonly brought against ships—in response to criminal acts like piracy
or in situations where a ship caused someone’s death—although it was
impractical to seek out the foreign party who owned the offending
vessel.31 Although the government intended to use forfeitures as a
mechanism for compensation, especially as forfeitures continued
throughout the 1800s, the government also sought, in part, to punish
criminals by confiscating their property.32 However, with the exception
of a brief spike in forfeitures during the Prohibition Era, civil forfeiture
actions remained relatively dormant until the early 1970s when the
economic and criminal landscapes of America changed.33
The War on Drugs reignited government use of civil forfeitures.34
When Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Controlled Substances Act of 1970,35 the government gained the power
to seize property used or intended to be used in the commission of a drug
offense punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.36 This Act
helped launch the War on Drugs by targeting instrumentalities, proceeds,
and other real property associated with drug crimes.37 Additionally, in
1984, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act38 established the
Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund to receive the proceeds of
forfeitures and to pay the costs associated with forfeitures, including the
managing and disposing of property, satisfying valid liens, mortgages,
other innocent owner claims, and costs associated with accomplishing the

30. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 720.
31. HOLMES, supra note 27, at 29.
32. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827) (“But the practice has been, and so this Court
understand[s] the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly
unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam.”); United States v. The Cargo of the Brig
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 210 (1844) (“[T]o protect the commerce of the United States and
punish the crime of piracy, any armed vessel . . . may be condemned and sold, the proceeds
whereof to be distributed between the United States and the captors, at the discretion of the court.”
(emphasis added)).
33. See Walter J. Van Eck, Note, The New Oregon Civil Forfeiture Law, 26 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 449, 449 (1990).
34. Alan Nicgorski, The Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the “War on Drugs,” and the
Constitution: Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil Forfeitures, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 374, 381–82 (1996) (describing how civil forfeiture was designed as a weapon to end the
narcotics trade).
35. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (2012)).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2012).
37. Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 376.
38. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
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legal forfeiture of the property.39 Furthermore, the 1984 Act empowered
the Attorney General to use the funds to pay for any necessary operations
associated with forfeiture proceedings, as well as general investigative
expenses.40
As a result, civil forfeiture exploded throughout the 1980s. Drug
offense arrests increased drastically and law enforcement began seizing
large amounts of property.41 As the amount of forfeited assets increased,
law enforcement agencies pocketed more proceeds.42 Equitable sharing
programs also increased in popularity—these programs allowed state law
enforcement agencies to keep large shares of the profits from forfeited
property if they participated in investigations or the turnover of forfeited
property to the federal government.43 As civil forfeiture rapidly became
both more popular and more impactful,44 the judiciary faced more
questions about the legal ramifications of and the protections in civil
forfeiture actions, particularly with regard to the Excessive Fines Clause
of the Eighth Amendment.
Austin v. United States45 became the first landmark case to hold that
the Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil forfeiture actions.46 In Austin,
the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of cocaine possession with the
intent to distribute, and the government subsequently brought an in rem
action against the defendant’s mobile home and body shop.47 During the
commission of the crime, the defendant left his body shop, went to his
mobile home, and then returned to the body shop with cocaine, which he
later sold to someone else.48 While searching the body shop and the
mobile home, law enforcement found drugs, drug paraphernalia, a gun,
and cash.49 In response to the in rem action, the defendant argued that the
39. Asset Forfeiture Program, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/afp/fund
[https://perma.cc/95H5-GWLY].
40. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (2012) (authorizing the enumeration of these powers and the use of
assets).
41. Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 376 (“With such strong support from the highest levels of
authority, the value of the assets seized by the federal government in the war on drugs has
skyrocketed since the Department of Justice established the National Assets Seizure and
Forfeiture Fund in 1985.”).
42. Developments in the Law—Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1732 (2015) (“Since
2001, local police have seized over $2.5 billion through the federal statute, 81% of which came
from people who were not charged with a crime. Police used this revenue to pay for everything
from informants and weaponry to publicity efforts . . . and luxury vehicles.” (footnote omitted)).
43. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ASSET FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL 105 (2016),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/839521/download [https://perma.cc/58Y5-L3W6].
44. Adam Crepelle, Probable Cause to Plunder: Civil Asset Forfeiture and the Problems It
Creates, 7 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 315, 325–26 (2017).
45. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
46. Id. at 604.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 605.
49. Id.
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forfeiture of the mobile home and body shop violated the Eighth
Amendment.50 The Court agreed and held that the Excessive Fines Clause
applied to statutory in rem forfeitures because the forfeiture, at least in
part, served a punitive purpose.51
Although forfeiture can serve a remedial purpose by removing
dangerous items or contraband from society, the Austin Court conceded
that the defendant’s mobile home and body shop were not criminal
instruments of the drug trade, so the act of forfeiting them did not
constitute compensation.52 This case opened the door for potential
constitutional violations and resultant protection for individuals subject
to civil proceedings. However, the Court refused to provide a specific
standard for measuring when a civil forfeiture action violates the
Excessive Fines Clause.53 After Austin, without a concrete standard, the
lower courts attempted to define the test for potential violations.54
However, the Supreme Court of the United States did not reenter the
conversation until United States v. Bajakajian.55
Bajakajian marked the first time the Court struck down a forfeiture
action or fine as unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause.56
Bajakajian involved a criminal forfeiture where a defendant attempted to
leave the United States without reporting, as required by federal law, that
he was transporting more than $10,000 in currency.57 The defendant
pleaded guilty to the failure to report and sought a bench trial with regard
to the forfeiture.58 The lower court held that the $357,144 the defendant
carried was subject to forfeiture because the currency was “involved in”
the offense.59 On appeal, the defendant argued that the full forfeiture was
grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense.60 The Court
agreed.61 The Court also engaged in a discussion regarding how the
Excessive Fines Clause applied to civil in rem proceedings because “[a]
forfeiture that reaches beyond this strict historical limitation is ipso facto
50. Id.
51. Id. at 618.
52. Id. at 621.
53. Charmin Bortz Shiely, Note, United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New Standard for
Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to Criminal Forfeitures Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?, 77
N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1596–97 (1999).
54. Shiely, supra note 53, at 1597 (“[T]he lower courts have had to determine what
analytical framework to use. Without guidance from the Supreme Court, inconsistent standards
among the lower courts have been inevitable. Therefore, the extent to which the Excessive Fines
Clause may provide relief from civil forfeiture remains untested.” (footnotes omitted)).
55. 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
56. Id. at 334.
57. Id. at 324.
58. Id. at 325.
59. Id. at 325–26.
60. Id. at 324.
61. Id.
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punitive and therefore subject to review under the Excessive Fines
Clause.”62
Some scholars questioned if this analysis, either intentionally or
unintentionally, actually loosened the restraints on the government in
civil forfeiture proceedings, because the Bajakajian Court seemingly
allowed civil forfeiture to be used for the sole purpose of imposing
punishment.63 As such, the government could essentially bypass the
fundamental procedural protections found in criminal forfeiture—such as
the right to counsel and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard—to
impose a harsher, swifter punishment. And this punishment would be
constitutional unless it was grossly disproportionate to the punishment
that would have been imposed in a criminal proceeding.64 The uncertain
nature of the analysis in Bajakajian further kindled concerns about the
uncertainty surrounding the implementation and enforcement of civil
forfeiture actions.
By the close of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court of the United
States had answered several crucial questions about the constitutional
nature of civil forfeiture actions65—specifically that civil forfeiture could
serve a punitive purpose66—but the Court left much for the lower courts
and state legislatures to decipher. Before the lower courts began to
substantially interpret the new holdings, the federal legislature swiftly
stepped in to reform federal civil forfeiture law.67 This reform directly
affected all state law enforcement agencies, and the legislature intended
for it to alleviate some of the concerns surrounding the lack of due process
protection for property owners involved in forfeiture prosecutions.
II. LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES AND CHANGES TO CIVIL
FORFEITURE LAWS
In response to new precedent that redefined the reach and limitations
of civil forfeiture,68 Congress passed the Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of

62. Id. at 333 n.8.
63. Shiely, supra note 53, at 1632.
64. Id.
65. See generally Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (deciding when a punitive forfeiture violates
the Excessive Fines Clause); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (deciding that forfeiture
is a monetary punishment and is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause).
66. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
67. Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106–185, 114 Stat. 202
(2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012)).
68. United States v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In
response to widespread criticism of this regime, Congress enacted CAFRA.” (citation omitted)).
See United States v. $39,480.00 in U.S. Currency, 190 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931–32 (W.D. Tex. 2002)
(“However, the Court is well aware that, as a general rule, forfeitures are not favored by the law
and statutes providing for forfeitures are strictly construed.”).
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2000 (CAFRA).69 To alleviate due process concerns. CAFRA
significantly modified federal civil forfeiture procedures.70 CAFRA
heightened the government’s burden of proof from a probable cause
standard to a preponderance of the evidence standard,71 making it more
difficult for the government to establish the criminality of property.
CAFRA imposed another restriction on the government by requiring it to
serve notice of a forfeiture action within sixty days.72 And CAFRA made
several remedial reforms on the behalf of property owners, including a
comprehensive innocent-owner-defense, whereas prior to CAFRA,
courts did not consider the owner’s possible innocence.73 The innocentowner-defense allowed an owner to assert her innocent ownership over
the property in question if she could prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that she either did not know of the conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture, or that upon learning of conduct giving rise to the forfeiture,
she did all that could reasonably be expected to terminate criminal use of
her property.74 CAFRA thus altered the burden-shifting model so that
both the government and the property owner needed to prove their cases
by a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to only the innocent
owner having the higher burden of proof.75 CAFRA also allowed for
indigent defendants to receive court appointed counsel, but only so long
as the property at issue was real property used as a primary residence by
the owner.76
These changes seemed to significantly enhance due process protection
for property owners. However, concerns surrounding the potential abuse
of civil forfeiture persisted because the government’s burden of proof
remained relatively low while the cost for a plaintiff to defend her
property remained relatively high,77 excluding the narrow exception for
69. Pub. L. No. 106–185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983
(2012)).
70. Todd Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 104–05 (2001) (listing the “substantial
improvements” CAFRA made in addressing the due process protections of individuals).
71. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1184 (“Prior to the enactment of
CAFRA . . . [t]he government bore the minimal burden of demonstrating probable cause for
instituting the forfeiture proceeding.”).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i).
73. See $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d at 1184.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 983(d).
75. Prior to CAFRA, the government needed to demonstrate that the property was subject
to civil forfeiture by a probable cause standard, and then the burden shifted to the property owner,
who had to show that the property was not subject to forfeiture by a preponderance of the
evidence, a noticeably higher burden than the government’s. United States v. $174,206.00 in U.S.
Currency, 320 F.3d 658, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2003).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A).
77. Specifically, the burden shifting model, in forcing the defendant to prove the
“innocence” of the legally fictitious guilty property, still eliminates the usual presumption of
innocence afforded in criminal forfeitures and criminal proceedings. Although CAFRA imposed
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court-appointed counsel in the case of real property. Although Congress
enacted CAFRA to lessen the government’s reach and enhance
procedural protection for defendants, the government appeared to still
wield an unbalanced power over individuals (particularly third parties)
attempting to defend the confiscation of their property.78 CAFRA also
allowed law enforcement agencies (specifically state law enforcement
agencies) to keep up to 100% of the proceeds obtained through forfeiture,
thus constructively incentivizing them to pursue the seizure of property.79
Many states responded to these concerns surrounding civil forfeiture
by enacting reformative legislation. These states have either heightened
the burdens imposed on the government or substantially altered forfeiture
procedures post-CAFRA. Since 2014, eleven states—New Mexico,80
Nebraska,81 Maryland,82 Florida,83 Minnesota,84 Montana,85 Michigan,86

substantial reforms, it also placed great hardships on individuals in defending their property.
Barnet, supra note 70, at 107 (“The claimant is left with the often insurmountable burden of
proving innocence . . . because, as the fiction prescribes, it is the property itself and not the owner
who is on trial. Because there is no criminal trial following the preponderance determination, the
government enjoys a considerable advantage.”).
78. Id. (signaling that the personification of the “guilty property” that still exists in CAFRA
conceals certain process protections for defendants by shifting the burden).
79. Crepelle, supra note 44, at 327.
80. H.B. 560, 52nd Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015) (effectively abolishing civil forfeiture
altogether and only allowing forfeiture of property upon criminal conviction).
81. L.B. 1106, 104th Leg., 2d Sess. (Neb. 2016) (constructively eliminating most civil
forfeiture proceedings by requiring a criminal conviction associated with certain crimes and
enhancing prosecutorial reporting requirements regarding forfeitures).
82. H.B. 336, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2016) (raising the government’s burden of proof
from a preponderance of the evidence to a clear and convincing evidence).
83. S.B. 1044, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2016) (raising the evidentiary standard in
contraband forfeiture actions to beyond a reasonable doubt, although a criminal conviction is still
not required).
84. S.B. 874, 88th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2014) (raising the state’s burden of proof to clear
and convincing evidence).
85. H.B. 463, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2015) (stating that the defendant must be
convicted of a criminal offense giving rise to the forfeiture and that the state must prove the crime
was connected to the property by clear and convincing evidence).
86. MICH. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
ASSET FORFEITURE IN MICHIGAN (2016) (raising the burden of proof to clear and convincing
evidence and also instituting new reporting requirements for law enforcement to more effectively
track forfeiture demographics).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/6

10

Milliron: Addressing Due Process Concerns: Evaluating Proposals for Civil A

1389

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

New Hampshire,87 Georgia,88 Virginia,89 and Mississippi90—and
Washington D.C.91 have passed some form of civil forfeiture reform.
Notably, all of these pieces of legislation passed within the last four
years.92 Additionally, during January 2017, a bill was introduced in the
Indiana Senate proposing reforms including treating seized property
where a person has asserted an ownership interest differently from seized
property that was abandoned or unclaimed.93 The bill permitted seized
property that was not abandoned or unclaimed to be forfeited to the state
only if the person who owned or used the property has been convicted of
a criminal offense, and repealed a provision permitting the state to turn
over seized property to the federal government.94
Although the bill’s progress halted in March 2017, the Indiana bill and
the reforms enacted in eleven other states and Washington D.C. revealed
a trend toward civil forfeiture reform. Summarily, states have attempted
or are attempting to reform civil forfeiture by either raising the
government’s burden of proof, altering the burden-shifting model to
protect the defendant and place the burden solely on the government, or
removing incentives from law enforcement by placing proceeds in
87. S.B. 522, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2016) (requiring a criminal conviction in most
cases and requiring law enforcement to return all assets seized to a general fund, thereby
preventing law enforcement from keeping the proceeds). However, New Hampshire Public
Radio later reported in 2018 that state law enforcement agencies were able to circumvent the
criminal conviction requirement by calling federal law enforcements agencies to conduct the
same seizure of property. See Todd Bookman, ‘Loophole’ Helps N.H. Law Enforcement Net
Millions Through Civil Asset Forfeiture, N.H. PUB. RADIO, (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.nhpr.org/
post/loophole-helps-nh-law-enforcement-net-millions-through-civil-asset-forfeiture#stream/0
[https://perma.cc/BW73-4D55].
88. H.B. 233, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2015) (creating a standardized reporting system
for disclosing forfeiture actions by law enforcement, among other modifications to civil
forfeiture).
89. S.B. 457, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (raising the burden to clear and convincing
evidence).
90. H.B. 1410, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (creating a designated task force to
review forfeiture cases and recommend legislative reforms).
91. B. 20-0048, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (D.C. 2013) (eliminating burden shifting model of
proof in favor of placing the burden on the government instead of requiring the owner to prove
her innocence).
92. The sudden increase in state legislation within the past five years may be attributable to
the recent increase in news coverage detailing the victimization of individuals who attempted to
fight civil forfeiture proceedings but failed due to a lack of adequate resources and support. See,
e.g., Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2013/08/12/taken [https://perma.cc/Z58Z-5ATE]. Narrative stories describing the
severe effects on people’s lives when private property has been taken away from them can offer
a “powerful catalyst for legislative change.” Louis S. Rulli, On the Road to Civil Gideon: Five
Lessons from the Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil
Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 683, 714 (2011).
93. S.B. 8, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2017).
94. Id.
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general funds or disengaging from equitable sharing programs with the
federal government.
This turbulent history of civil forfeiture set the stage for a significant
change brought on by the judiciary, as potentially foreshadowed by
Justice Thomas in Leonard v. Texas.95 Forfeiture actions originated
during the reign of the English Crown, where the religious rule conflated
legality and assets were forfeited to atone for the wrongdoer’s actions and
save the King’s soul.96 As English roots extended into the colonial legal
system, forfeiture developed into a tool to seize property to both
compensate the government and condemn the wrongdoer.97 Civil
forfeiture remained mostly dormant for the following century until there
was a drastic increase in anti-drug enforcement laws seeking to obtain the
ill-gotten gains from drug transactions.98 As forfeitures increased through
the 1980s, the courts clashed in defining the limits of civil forfeiture as
exhibited in Austin and Bajakajian.99 Although Congress attempted to
assuage civil forfeiture abuses in passing CAFRA,100 backlash over the
government’s low burden of proof and the plaintiff’s seemingly
impossible task of proving innocence continued. Post-CAFRA, various
changes in state legislation indicated unrest surrounding forfeiture
procedures, leading up to the Leonard statement that re-opened the door
looking into the historical justifications for modern forfeiture.101
Moreover, greater media coverage of civil forfeiture abuses in recent
years has also captured the attention of lawmakers.102 Notably, in Justice
Thomas’s statement in Leonard, he specifically cites a lengthy feature in
the New Yorker that chronicled extensive abuses by law enforcement in
95. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 850 (2017). Justice Thomas concluded the statement
with, “Whether this Court's treatment of the broad modern forfeiture practice can be justified by
the narrow historical one is certainly worthy of consideration in greater detail.” Id.
96. HOLMES, supra note 27, at 25 (“The same thing has remained true in England until well
into this century, with regard even to inanimate objects. . . . It was to be given to God, that is to
say to the Church, for the king, to be expended for the good of his soul.”).
97. See The Cargo of the Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 210 (1844); The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
1, 15 (1827).
98. Nicgorski, supra note 34, at 381.
99. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998); Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 604 (1992).
100. See Annemarie Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War
on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 706 (2014).
101. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 850 (2017).
102. See Matt Ford, The Bipartisan Opposition to Sessions’s New Civil-Forfeiture Rules,
ATLANTIC (July 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/sessionsforfeiture-justice-department-civil/534168/ [https://perma.cc/J8M4-C62X]; Michael Sallah et
al., Stop and Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/
investigative/2014/09/06/stop-and-seize/?utm_term=.78c17543fbf0 [https://perma.cc/A6V7J7WS]; Nick Wing, Florida Just Made It Harder for Police to Take People’s Stuff, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/florida-civil-asset-forfeiture_us_
56fe9d7ce4b0a06d5805896d [https://perma.cc/7WGR-3XXU].
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taking property from poor and working class citizens.103 The breadth of
coverage reporting on civil asset forfeiture abuses reflects a poignant
historical moment where extensive and zealous journalism challenged the
law to change.
This unsettled history and the growing trend toward reformation
signals that either the judiciary or legislature may seek to enact larger
changes in forfeiture law in the near future. The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari on June 18, 2018, in Timbs v. Indiana,104
looking at whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to state and local
authorities.105 Some media outlets have predicted that Timbs is the
Supreme Court’s opportunity to end civil asset forfeiture;106 however,
regardless of the Timbs outcome, the case will extend the Austin and
Bajakaijan dialogue. Therefore, Austin and Bajakaijan will continue to
have a significant impact on the standard that state law enforcement
agencies must abide by when implementing potentially devastating
proprietary punishments like civil asset forfeitures. Media attention
focusing on abuse through civil forfeiture and celebrating the passage of
reformation also suggests a strengthening push for reform.107 Legal
scholars have thus proposed various solutions to mitigate due process
concerns and the problematic pace of forfeiture proceedings.
III. POTENTIAL PROPOSALS FOR CIVIL FORFEITURE REFORM AND
THEIR VIABILITY
Over the last twenty years, many legal scholars have proposed
different solutions to address the multi-faceted concerns arising out of
civil forfeiture. Part III of this Note will look at the most significant
solutions that have been proposed and analyze the major arguments
behind them to determine their potential viability.

103. Stillman, supra, note 92.
104. 138 S. Ct. 2650 (2018).
105. See State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1180–81 (Ind. 2017), cert. granted, Timbs v.
Indiana, 138 S. Ct. 2650 (2018).
106. See Jibran Khan, Property Rights Get Their Day in Court, NAT’L REV. (July 18, 2018),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/07/civil-asset-forfeiture-timbs-indiana-could-end/
[https://perma.cc/F7GE-LE2A].
107. See Wing, supra note 102; Nick Sibilla, Washington, D.C. Council Votes to Reform
City's Civil Forfeiture Laws, Ban Policing for Profit, FORBES MAG. (Dec. 3, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2014/12/03/washington-d-c-council-votes-toreform-citys-civil-forfeiture-laws-ban-policing-for-profit/#2a7b6c263010l [https://perma.cc/
JVM8-S89N]; Jason Snead, How a New Hampshire Law Will Protect Private Property from
Government Seizure, DAILY SIGNAL (June 3, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/06/03/how-anew-hampshire-law-will-protect-private-property-from-government-seizure/ [https://perma.cc/
BJ2U-UFCL].
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A. Raising the Government’s Burden of Proof
As exhibited by many of the states that have enacted civil forfeiture
reform,108 raising the government’s burden of proof provides a relatively
easy way for the legislature to restrain the excessive and expedient nature
of forfeiture actions. By raising the evidentiary standard from a
preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence or
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the legislature would effectively
require the government to conduct further investigation and expend
additional resources in proving property’s “guilt.”
By raising the evidentiary standard to beyond a reasonable doubt, the
legislature would constructively abolish civil forfeiture because the
prosecution would have to meet the highest legal standard—one
traditionally associated with criminal law—simply to confiscate
property. The prosecution would no longer benefit from bringing civil
and criminal forfeiture actions simultaneously, because both burdens
would be high and the facts needed to prove the property’s criminality
would significantly overlap with those required to prove the defendant’s
guilt.109 Procedurally, a criminal and a civil forfeiture action regarding
the same property would ultimately be costly and inefficient. This change
in the legal standard would eliminate the procedural expediency of civil
forfeiture, which currently allows for the acquisition of “guilty property”
without proving the guilt of the person. Because criminal forfeiture
actions are embedded with significantly more due process safeguards for
the property and property owner than are civil forfeiture actions,110 the
effects of raising the government’s burden to beyond a reasonable doubt
would ultimately reduce many due process concerns by pushing
forfeiture actions into the realm of criminal law.

108. New Mexico, Nebraska, Maryland, Florida, Minnesota, Montana, Michigan, New
Hampshire, and Washington D.C. have enacted civil forfeiture reform either raising the burden of
proof to clear and convincing evidence or to beyond a reasonable doubt. In raising the
government’s burden to beyond a reasonable doubt, those states have constructively or actually
eliminated civil forfeiture altogether in favor of criminal forfeiture, which includes the
significantly greater due process protections applied to criminal prosecutions.
109. Logically, in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the property was used in or derived
from a criminal act, the prosecutor would have to prove to the highest legal standard that a criminal
act occurred, which by extension would involve proving the criminal acts of the defendant.
Because the facts would be the same, it would no longer be procedurally efficient to bring two
separate actions. But see Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 183, 226 (1996) (citing several “mundane” reasons prosecutors bring parallel proceedings,
such as a lack of knowledge between the civil and criminal attorneys about which actions the
other is bringing in regards to the case).
110. Historically, the term “parallel proceedings” refers to prosecuting both civil and
criminal forfeiture actions simultaneously, and the potential for merging these two proceedings
has been considered by scholars since the contentious judicial changes in Austin. See Martin,
supra note 20, at 682–85.
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Under the umbrella of raising the burden of proof in court
proceedings, some legal scholars have also suggested other requirements,
such as needing a warrant to seize property.111 This requirement attempts
to eliminate law enforcement’s ability to seize property without an
accompanying arrest. A warrant requirement would effectively nudge
civil forfeiture law closer to criminal forfeiture law by requiring a
simultaneous criminal case instead of allowing a civil forfeiture action to
stand alone. The legislature could impose this requirement; however, no
states have passed any legislation to this effect.
Although the Fourth Amendment attaches certain protections to
homes and curtilages in an effort to respect an individual’s right to
privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not traditionally protect the privacy
of property itself.112 In theory, implementing a warrant requirement
would strengthen the “substantial connection” of property to illegal
criminal acts113 and therefore limit law enforcement’s ability to seize
some property.114 However, many forfeitable items, such as contraband
and other items that constitute evidence of criminal activity, can be seized
without a warrant because their presence constitutes exigent
circumstances.115 Because property can function as exigent
circumstances during a lawful warrantless search, it is unlikely that a
warrant requirement would be effective in offering greater protection to
defendants and property owners. Given this well-established precedent
and the lack of legislative action proposing a warrant requirement in civil
forfeitures, it seems unlikely that this proposal will succeed.
Additionally, other legal scholars have proposed a differentiatingburden-approach—imposing different burdens of proof depending on the
category of property. One scholar proposed three classifications for
property subject to forfeiture: contraband, proceeds, and facilitating

111. Crepelle, supra note 44, at 357 (“If law enforcement cannot obtain a warrant, an arrest
should have to be made in conjunction with the seizure. After all, when law enforcement seizes
cash or property and lets the owner go, either a criminal is let loose or an innocent person has her
property confiscated.”).
112. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (noting that the touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3) (2012).
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .” (emphasis added)).
115. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 (1977) (holding that the Constitution allows
warrantless searches of property if law enforcement has probable cause to believe that the property
contains contraband or evidence of a crime).
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property.116 Forfeitures of contraband117 would necessitate a low burden
of proof, even as low as probable cause, given the inherent illegality of
contraband;118 proceeds would be evaluated by the preponderance of the
evidence standard or higher;119 forfeitures against facilitating property—
commonly known as the instrumentalities of crime, such as cash—would
be abolished, because these types of forfeitures tend to lead to the most
flagrant abuses and injustices.120 Another scholar who acknowledged the
differentiating-burden-approach121 further recognized that the divide
between the government’s burden of proof in civil and criminal forfeiture
cases is a continuing source of injustice.122 The strategy behind the
differentiating-burden-approach works toward eliminating due process
concerns. For example, if civil forfeitures over properties like cash were
altogether abolished, law enforcement would no longer have the
heightened incentive to confiscate property and take advantage of
individuals who are incapable of defending their property against
forfeiture actions. However, as expressed previously, given the lack of
communication between civil and criminal prosecutors and the existing
confusion surrounding the arcane laws of forfeiture,123 an approach
involving three different burdens may only add to the confusion in
pursuing civil forfeitures cases. As such, raising the burden of proof
uniformly for all property subject to forfeiture may be the more
procedurally efficient way to safeguard against abuses, particularly as
reflected by the actions in state legislatures.124
When CAFRA raised the burden of proof from probable cause to a
preponderance of the evidence, it implicitly acknowledged that the
burden on the government is one of the problematic aspects of forfeiture
cases. Although altering the probable cause warrant requirement does not
appear to be a viable option for change, legislative action to raise the
burden of proof could be an easy way to add an institutional safeguard in
forfeiture proceedings.

116. David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal Court,
13 NEV. L.J. 1, 55 (2012).
117. An item qualifies as contraband when its incriminating nature is immediately apparent.
See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983).
118. Pimentel, supra note 116, at 55–56.
119. Id. at 56.
120. Id. at 57. Professor Pimentel also points out that even with raising the burden,
particularly in the forfeiture of proceeds, forfeiture abuses will likely continue, given the incentive
for law enforcement to seize property because they directly benefit from the forfeitures.
121. Bridy, supra note 100.
122. Id. at 707.
123. Klein, supra note 109.
124. See supra note 108 (listing all of the possible states).
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B. A Right to Counsel in All Civil Forfeiture Proceedings
CAFRA opened the door for a more expansive right to courtappointed counsel when it allowed some indigent claimants to receive
counsel if the forfeited property was real property used as a primary
residence.125 Additionally, CAFRA allowed a person to use her courtappointed counsel that had previously been assigned in a related criminal
proceeding.126 When contemplating extending of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to individuals contesting civil forfeiture actions, the
House directly acknowledged that civil forfeiture actions “are so punitive
in nature that appointed counsel should be made available for those who
are indigent, or made indigent by a seizure, in appropriate
circumstances.”127 The House also recognized that many individuals
probably chose to refrain from challenging forfeiture actions, not because
they were guilty, but because without the assistance of counsel the costs
associated with legal action were too expensive for individuals to
afford.128 Although Congress chose to extend the right to assistance of
counsel only to those individuals with a related criminal case and cases
involving the forfeiture of a primary residence, this compromise shows
the partial extension of constitutional protection to individuals contesting
civil forfeitures. The House’s reasoning reflects civil forfeiture’s
confusing and hybrid nature—civil forfeiture is deeply intertwined with
criminal punishments that have devastating consequences on people’s
lives. However, because there is no possibility of prison time,129
forfeiture actions remained bound to the looser procedural demands of
civil law. As a result, CAFRA embodied many half-measures, like the
partial right to counsel that compromised constitutional protections.130
This allowed civil forfeiture actions to continue as civil actions without
accompanying criminal cases despite the integral component of illegality
to civil forfeiture cases.
If state legislatures or Congress extended the right to court-appointed
counsel to all indigent individuals contesting civil forfeiture proceedings,
civil forfeiture actions would be pushed closer toward criminal law.131
125. 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A) (2012).
126. Id. § 983(b)(1)(A); see also Barnet, supra note 70, at 105 (noting that these changes in
court-appointed counsel served as a large step in enhancing due process protections but that the
legislation still left many indigent claimants without a right to counsel).
127. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 14 (1999).
128. Id.
129. Id. (suggesting that the House cannot extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
all civil forfeiture cases because the parties are not threatened with imprisonment).
130. Civil Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), Pub. L. No. 106–185, 114 Stat. 202
(2000) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012)).
131. Louis S. Rulli, Access to Justice and Civil Forfeiture Reform: Providing Lawyers for
the Poor and Recapturing Forfeited Assets for Impoverished Communities, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 507, 513–14 (1998) (describing how civil forfeiture proceedings share a strong resemblance

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 6

2018]

ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS

1396

This would give the most vulnerable populations an enhanced
constitutional protection, as they would have the means to challenge
forfeiture actions brought against them.132 However, this remedy only
extends to a limited population, and it fails to address situations where
law enforcement confiscates valuable property from an individual who
would incur great expense contesting the forfeiture.133 Extending the right
to counsel would protect one of the most vulnerable populations in civil
forfeiture proceedings,134 but it is likely that the vast majority of forfeiture
cases will still go unchallenged because of the financial burden and risk
of contesting it.
Although the Court acknowledged that civil forfeitures are “quasicriminal proceedings” that can function punitively135 and the House
acknowledged their harsh punitive nature,136 the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel is historically bound to criminal cases.137 Because state
legislatures have yet to extend the right to counsel in civil forfeiture
cases,138 and given the House’s direct rejection of extending the right to
counsel in CAFRA,139 this reform proposal seems unlikely to sway
legislatures. It would also be less effective in addressing due process
concerns because many forfeitures would likely remain unchallenged.
C. Significant Changes in Drug Laws and Drug
Enforcement Oversight
Forfeiture actions reignited during the 1970s and 1980s when the
government sharpened its focus on drug enforcement.140 The Controlled

to criminal proceedings, and yet the lack of counsel creates substantial confusion for indigent
homeowners going through the legal process alone).
132. One author requested information from the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), the
entity that provides counsel to individuals under CAFRA, for the number of court-appointed
attorneys assigned to homeowners in civil forfeiture actions from 2000–2007. See Rulli, supra
note 92, at 745. LSC reported that it only appointed counsel twenty-eight times in the seven-year
period. Id. Roughly applying the broad statistic that eighty percent of civil forfeitures are
uncontested, the author estimated that roughly twenty-four of the twenty-eight cases would have
gone uncontested if the homeowners had not received court-appointed counsel. Id. As such, the
nature of court-appointed counsel significantly expands a person’s right to challenge the forfeiture
of personal property without incurring great and unfair expense.
133. See Stillman, supra note 92 (detailing extensive accounts of individuals who were
unable to defend their property).
134. In Leonard, Justice Thomas recognized the poor as one of the most vulnerable
populations. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017).
135. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
136. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 14 (1999).
137. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
138. See supra note 108.
139. H.R. REP. NO. 106-192, at 14.
140. Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic
Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 55 (1998) (“What forfeiture does do well is raise money. Police
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Substances Act141 triggered an increase in forfeitures, primarily those
connected to drug crimes.142 Although there are no formal or fully
comprehensive statistics about the number of forfeitures directly
connected to drug crimes,143 because the Controlled Substances Act
specifically allowed the use of civil forfeitures, it is clear that many
forfeitures are intimately tied to drug crimes. Additionally, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) functions as one of the primary
branches of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in using civil forfeitures to
ferret out drug activity.144 This modern practice of enforcing drug laws
by using forfeitures statutorily—primarily by using organizations like the
DEA—shows how forfeitures are still intertwined with the changing
attitudes and efforts toward low-level drug enforcement.
Currently, there is a national movement toward ameliorating the harsh
consequences of the War on Drugs, particularly on low-level drug
offenders.145 The Obama Administration began shifting drug
enforcement efforts away from incarceration and toward rehabilitation
and treatment by reducing the sentences of hundreds of federal prisoners
and spending more money on drug treatment.146 In addition to the federal
government’s relaxed enforcement of drug laws, many states also relaxed
and prosecutors argue that 21 USC § 881 enables them to carry out ordinary law enforcement
business and raise money at the same time—to do well by doing good.” (footnote omitted)).
141. Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (2012)).
142. See generally United States v. $63,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 781 F.3d 949, 952 (8th Cir.
2015) (affirming the forfeiture of cash acquired during a traffic stop where the defendant
consented to the use of a drug-sniffing dog, even though no drugs were found); United States v.
427 & 429 Hall Street, 74 F.3d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming the forfeiture of a grocery
store because defendant’s charge was premised on intent to distribute even though he was only
convicted of a misdemeanor possession charge); United States v. $21,055.00 in U.S. Currency,
778 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1102 (D. Kan. 2011) (affirming the forfeiture of cash found in a driver’s
truck bed because it was associated with a drug transaction, even though no drug transaction was
proven).
143. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S
OVERSIGHT OF CASH SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE ACTIVITIES (2017) (recommending the DEA
develop a more comprehensive system for tracking data on forfeitures to more accurately
determine if civil liberty abuses are occurring).
144. DEA
Asset
Forfeiture,
U.S.
DRUG
ENFORCEMENT
ADMIN.,
https://www.dea.gov/ops/af.shtml [https://perma.cc/BZT2-SHJJ].
145. In 2014, the DOJ announced a clemency initiative where it encouraged federal prisoners
to seek a pardon from the President, if they were nonviolent low-level offenders who did not have
significant ties to larger drug organizations.
146. See German Lopez, How Obama Quietly Reshaped America’s War on Drugs, VOX (Jan.
19, 2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/12/19/13903532/obama-war-on-drugs-legacy
[https://perma.cc/U4Q5-JRXW]; German Lopez, Obama’s Drug Czar: “We can’t arrest and
incarcerate addiction out of people,” VOX (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2015/12/14/10106372/drug-czar-michael-botticelli [https://perma.cc/AF23-KMVT]
(using figures from the Office of National Drug Control Policy to illustrate increased spending on
treatment and prevention from 2003 to 2015).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 6 [2019], Art. 6

2018]

ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS CONCERNS

1398

sentencing laws for low-level drug offenses or decriminalized the
possession of marijuana.147 The DOJ and individual states have also
begun to move away from mandatory-minimum sentencing structures
(which arose from the War on Drugs during the 1980s) to more efficiently
sentence and punish repeat offenders and to prevent nonviolent drug
offenders from serving lengthy, expensive prison sentences.148 American
attitudes about low-level drugs like marijuana have also changed:
Approximately 64% of Americans supported the legalization of
marijuana use in October 2017.149 In light of this national trend over the
past ten years—a trend in favor of legalizing marijuana use and reducing
mandatory-minimum sentences150—the use of civil asset forfeitures
could also decrease. Although there is minimal data tracking the number
of forfeitures generally,151 let alone the number of forfeitures connected
to drug encounters, low-level drug offenses provide one of the greatest
opportunities for law enforcement to use civil forfeiture to confiscate cash
and property from vulnerable communities.152 If state and federal law
enforcement no longer prioritized prosecuting these offenses, civil
forfeitures would likely decrease given their close connection to lowlevel drug offenses.
If the country’s cultural focus shifts from the War on Drugs
initiative—which caused the prison population to increase over 500% by
the 1990s153—toward more treatment-based approaches to drug crimes,
civil forfeitures are likely to decrease since they commonly occur in
147. As of January 2018, nine states have legalized marijuana, fourteen states have removed
jail time for possessing small amounts of marijuana (not counting the previous nine), and twelve
states allow medical marijuana (still not counting the previous nine states where marijuana is
legal).
State
Policy,
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT,
https://www.mpp.org/states/
[https://perma.cc/PYW3-6AQF].
148. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, In Milestone for Sentencing Reform, Attorney General
Holder Announces Record Reduction in Mandatory Minimums Against Nonviolent Drug
Offenders (Feb. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/milestone-sentencing-reformattorney-general-holder-announces-record-reduction-mandatory [https://perma.cc/39DV-2M26].
149. Justin McCarthy, Record High Support for Legalizing Marijuana Use in U.S.,
GALLUP (Oct. 25, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/221018/record-high-support-legalizingmarijuana.aspx [https://perma.cc/6PCJ-6LYB] (interpreting the 2017 Gallup Poll which showed
increasing support for marijuana legalization from 34% in 2002 to 64% in 2017).
150. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROSECUTION AND SENTENCING REFORM PRINCIPLES UNDER THE SMART ON
CRIME INITIATIVE (2017) (reviewing how the Smart on Crime initiative by former Attorney
General Eric Holder functioned in releasing low-level offenders from federal prison).
151. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
152. Timothy Williams, Marijuana Arrests Outnumber Those for Violent Crimes, Study
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/13/us/marijuanaarrests.html [https://perma.cc/DM5L-SDBD] (exploring how the prosecution of low-level drug
offenses disproportionately targets poor, African Americans).
153. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 6 (2012).
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tandem with these offenses.154 A reduction in civil forfeitures
corresponding to the de-emphasis on incarcerating individuals for lowlevel offenses would alleviate the burden on the most vulnerable
populations—particularly poor or minority communities—to contest
forfeitures of property and assert innocent ownership. Poor and minority
communities are disproportionately affected by civil forfeitures because
the process of contesting a forfeiture or asserting innocence requires
spending time and money that likely outweighs the value of the forfeited
thing itself.155 The executive branch and state legislatures have made
significant moves towards decriminalizing low-level offenses like the
possession of marijuana. Given that civil forfeitures arose alongside the
persecution of low-level drug offenders, it follows that forfeitures are
likely to fall with the decriminalization and de-emphasis on prosecuting
those same crimes.
However, this movement in reforming low-level drugs laws may
pause during the Trump Administration. Upon entering office, Attorney
General Jeff Sessions increased two major criminal justice initiatives that
run counter to these national trends.156 First, Sessions announced that he
intended to increase the enforcement of laws dealing with low-level drug
crimes involving marijuana, and further that he intended to research the
connection between violent crime and marijuana.157 Additionally,
Sessions announced his intent to increase civil forfeiture actions.158 The
resurgence of these initiatives potentially opens the door for an increase
in forfeiture actions as an easy procedural substitute for prosecuting lowlevel drug crimes that typically involve cash.159 This potential increase
could incentivize law enforcement officers to seek out more low-level
offenders and confiscate more property, property that is hard to defend
and hard to prove innocent ownership over.160 Although Sessions’s
initiatives reflect the attitudes that motivated the War on Drugs, the DOJ
and other federal agencies may still enact progressive changes to
safeguard against civil forfeiture abuse by increasing internal oversight
that will ensure fair law enforcement practices.
154. David Pimentel, Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: A Practical Approach to the
Excessive Fines Clause as a Check on Government Seizures, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 541, 542
(2017) (noting how the war on drugs directly caused the massive increase in civil forfeitures).
155. Louis S. Rulli, Seizing Family Homes from the Innocent: Can the Eighth Amendment
Protect Minorities and the Poor from Excessive Punishment in Civil Forfeiture?, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1111, 1157 (2017) (noting that even when identical conduct occurs, poor families are
far more likely to lose their homes compared to wealthier families).
156. Sarah Stillman, Jeff Sessions and the Resurgence of Civil-Asset Forfeiture, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/jeff-sessions-and-theresurgence-of-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.cc/9J33-Q8A4].
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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For example, the Office of the Inspector General periodically
investigates and audits the use of civil asset forfeitures by the federal
government,161 particularly in response to concerns about lack of judicial
and governmental oversight.162 The Inspector General’s 2017 Report
specifically referenced concerns about the use of forfeiture, especially as
a tool “to seize and forfeit cash or property without independent judicial
oversight and without charging the owner or possessor of the cash or
property with a crime.”163 Additionally, the report acknowledged that
federal equitable sharing programs have enabled state law enforcement
agencies to circumvent their own state laws in an effort to receive a
greater share of the forfeiture proceedings.164 The report also found that
the DEA did not measure how its forfeitures advanced criminal
investigations,165 that the DEA may have posed substantial risks to civil
liberties by seizing cash that may not have been related to criminal
investigations,166 and that there were no standard requirements for state
and local task force officers to receive training in civil forfeitures.167
This timely acknowledgment of these concerns reflects the bipartisan
political tension that exists surrounding forfeiture regulations. The
Inspector General’s almost exclusive focus on the DEA also supports the
undeniable link between ferreting out drug crimes and civil forfeiture as
a prominent tool in law enforcement’s arsenal. Although legislative
161. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND
SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2016)
(providing a forfeiture audit report for 2015); OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE
ASSETS FORFEITURE FUND AND SEIZED ASSET DEPOSIT FUND ANNUAL FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
FISCAL YEAR 2016 (2016) (providing a forfeiture audit report for 2016).
162. See generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 143 (stating that concerns
have been raised about the use of asset forfeiture).
163. Id. at i.
164. Id.
165. The DOJ has consistently expressed concerns about a lack of consistent reporting and
record-keeping within the DEA. In collecting data about the DEA’s use of asset forfeiture in
connection with criminal matters, the data may reveal whether the DEA is using asset forfeiture
to deter and punish criminal behavior or for other purposes that could potentially raise civil
liberties concerns. Id. at iii.
166. The DOJ recommended collecting data on the relationship between asset seizures and
criminal investigations to create a clearer picture, including details like the circumstances under
which forfeitures occurred and the benefits law enforcement derived from the seizures. Id. at 63.
In evaluating such specific details about the civil tool of criminal law enforcement, the DOJ is
clearly working to enhance its oversight and regulation of civil forfeiture practices. This potential
for greater oversight could lead to more internal regulation and self-policing of civil forfeitures,
which may be a more realistic resolution to the challenges impeding forfeiture reform.
167. The DOJ recommended that the DEA review its seizure practices to determine if more
training or specific policies were needed for law enforcement to enforce procedures consistently.
Id. at 64. The DOJ focused on consistency as a means of garnering public trust because
“[h]andling similar matters consistently in seizure operations is necessary to avoid the risk of
creating the appearance that decisions in these sensitive operations are arbitrary.” Id.
AND
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action to change drug laws would likely be one of the most significant
ways to remove law enforcement’s incentive to abuse civil forfeiture
actions, the prospect of these changes is uncertain.168 Thus, executive
agency enaction of greater oversight, like that instituted by the Inspector
General, or greater pressure on federal agencies and state and local law
enforcement to carefully regulate their own activities, is a more realistic
potential outcome. Political pressure on the DOJ appears to have
increased oversight of forfeiture actions within the last several years,169
and continued political pressure on these agencies may spur them into
more careful regulations and record keeping.
The undeniable link between drug laws and civil forfeiture suggests
potential civil forfeiture reform by reforming drug laws themselves. The
national movement appears to push towards decriminalizing marijuana
use and ameliorating overly stringent drug laws, particularly those related
to low-level offenses. However, given the resurgence of increased
penalties for drug laws and asset forfeitures under the current
administration, progress may have to occur independently within law
enforcement agencies in the meantime. If law enforcement agencies, both
federally and state-wide, establish clearer record keeping practices
related to the number and characteristics of asset forfeitures, while more
carefully monitoring how these actions impact the civil liberties of
defendants, civil forfeitures may decrease; vigilance about the procedural
fairness of forfeitures may increase simultaneously.
D. Reallocating Forfeited Assets to a General Restitution Fund
One of the most problematic aspects of civil forfeitures involves law
enforcement agencies’ abilities to pocket the assets forfeited.170 Equitable
sharing programs, where states may retain a certain percentage of the
168. On January 4, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memorandum rescinding
previous guidance relaxing marijuana enforcement nationwide. Memorandum from Jefferson B.
Sessions, Office of the Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018).
Sessions specifically cited 21 U.S.C. § 801, the Controlled Substances Act, which ignited the civil
forfeiture enforcement, and advised that this Act should serve as a basis for prosecuting marijuana
use and other crimes. Id. Sessions’s memorandum, among numerous other statements, appears to
halt the national movement towards legalizing marijuana.
169. In response to the 2014 report, several prominent news sources began to focus on the
large amount of money the government obtained from individuals without due process. See
generally Christopher Ingraham, Law Enforcement Took More Stuff from People than Burglars
Did Last Year, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2015/11/23/cops-took-more-stuff-from-people-than-burglars-did-last-year/?utm_term=
.55a8967586d1 [https://perma.cc/DD7X-NSY5] (discussing how the Treasury and Justice
Department deposited more than $5 billion into their asset forfeiture funds).
170. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ASSET FORFEITURE & MONEY LAUNDERING SECTION, ASSET
FORFEITURE POLICY MANUAL (2016) (the equitable sharing program enables this profit sharing
system between the federal government and states to occur), https://www.justice.gov/criminalafmls/file/839521/download [https://perma.cc/DH3V-MUDH].
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forfeited assets while providing some of the assets to the federal
government, create a rare system where federal and state law enforcement
agencies derive benefits from the smallest of crimes.171 Although many
law enforcement agencies use a portion of the funds to improve their local
offices by spending money on valuable items, such as training and
improved equipment,172 numerous news outlets have reported that some
officers have pocketed the proceeds directly or spent the assets on lavish,
unnecessary items for the agencies.173
The issue with this profit-sharing system is that it—intentionally or
unintentionally—motivates law enforcement to seek out opportunities to
take property, even when there is little suspicion of criminal activity.
Because there is a direct and tangible benefit from apprehending a person,
and because the person’s cash could be associated with crime, officers
can confiscate property when there is no reason or practical motivation
for such a forfeiture.174 As such, equitable sharing programs incentivize
law enforcement to seek out more opportunities to confiscate property,
leaving greater potential for due process abuses and the inability of
people to defend their property. Regardless of whether an officer actually
confiscated property based on wrongful motive, the simple fact that an
officer could have profit-seeking motives fosters public distrust of law
enforcement.175 Law enforcement functions as a public service to aid
society and remove criminals—not to profit off of the citizens it
protects.176

171. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 140, at 51 (describing how states may receive 80% of
the assets forfeited to the federal government, creating a system in which both entities profit).
172. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. et al., Asset Seizure Fuel Police Spending, WASH. POST (Oct. 11,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-policespending/?utm_term=.71f469bff1bb [https://perma.cc/Y2AU-SZN3] (describing use of assets for
overtime pay, file cabinets, fitness gear, weapons, and surveillance systems).
173. See also Erin Fuchs, Here Are the Ridiculous Things Cops Bought with Cash ‘Seized’
From Americans, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-whatpolice-bought-with-civil-forfeiture-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/WR9A-LV4P] (describing
purchases, such as a $5 million dollar helicopter for the Los Angeles Police, a $1 million dollar
command bus for a small department in Georgia, an expensive coffee maker, and a clown).
174. In Arizona, a federal judge recently allowed a case challenging the constitutionality of
the profit motive in civil asset forfeiture laws to move forward. Order at 16–17, Cox v. Voyles,
No. CV-15-01386-PHX-DJH (D. Ariz. 2017).
175. Rulli, supra note 155, at 1120 (“The very authorities entrusted with discretion over
when to use civil forfeiture laws now had a direct financial stake in the outcome of the cases they
filed. . . . The explosion of civil forfeiture cases has brought with it persistent allegations of
abuse.”).
176. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 details the specific oath of office for entering the civil service arena
must swear to the following: “[T]hat I will support and defend the Constitution of the United
States . . . that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.”
(emphasis added).
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Removing the profit incentive would likely strengthen public trust in
law enforcement and help avoid potential cases of forfeiture abuse
infringing on the due process rights of citizens. Several states have shifted
away from equitable sharing programs and instead funnel the assets
acquired into other funds.177 For example, Maine diverts most property
to a “General Fund,” which is the primary operating fund of the Maine
State Government, as opposed to funneling civil asset proceeds to the
local law enforcement agency that acquired the property.178 Louisiana
established a compromise system. In Louisiana, 60% of the forfeiture
assets go to the law enforcement agency that seized the property, 20%
goes to the district attorney’s office that handled the forfeiture action, and
20% goes to a criminal court fund.179 Although this arrangement may still
encourage law enforcement and prosecutors to pursue forfeiture cases,
the fact that some of the funds go to criminal court alleviates some
pressure on the agencies.
Additionally, Maryland requires that state law enforcement agencies
dispose of the property, keep it for official use, and pay any proceeds
from the sale of forfeited property to the state’s general fund.180 Maryland
places limits on how much a seizing or prosecuting authority may directly
or indirectly transfer to a federal law enforcement agency. 181 It also
requires the Governor to devote 20% of the proceeds deposited in the
state’s General Fund for the purpose of funding drug treatment and
education programs.182 Maryland offers a comprehensive model for
removing profit-motivated policing. Although it leaves some room for
law enforcement, particularly local agencies, to retain some of the funds,
it successfully uses forfeited proceeds for the benefit of all citizens and
even uses the proceeds for preventative programs like drug treatment.
If these assets are diverted into general restitution funds to address the
financial needs of crime victims, profit incentives would be reduced and

177. See the following examples: Maine, Louisiana, Maryland, and New Mexico.
178. ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 5824 (2018) (stating that any forfeited asset must either go to the
General Fund of the state or, if approved by the proper entity, the forfeited property may be
equitably transferred).
179. LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:2616 (2018) (detailing this breakdown of funds).
180. MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 12-403 (West 2018).
181. MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 12-212 (West 2018) (“A seizing authority or prosecuting
authority may not directly or indirectly transfer seized property to a federal law enforcement
authority or agency unless: (1) a criminal case related to the seizure is prosecuted in the federal
court system under federal law; (2) the owner of the property consents to the forfeiture; (3) the
property is cash of at least $50,000; or (4) the seizing authority transfers the property to a federal
authority under a federal seizure warrant issued to take custody of assets originally seized under
State law.”).
182. MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 12-405 (West 2018).
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those directly affected by crimes would receive a greater chance to heal
and move forward.183
For example, in New Mexico, the state legislature reformed civil
forfeiture laws in 2015 by requiring a criminal conviction before law
enforcement can seize the property. This established a clear and
convincing evidence standard by shifting the innocent-owner burden onto
government and sent 100% of the proceeds to the state’s general fund.184
Although New Mexico has struggled with some local agencies refusing
to turn over forfeited assets,185 this legislative reform exemplifies how
states can reject the federal government’s equitable sharing program and
remove police incentive to pursue lucrative but often less important
cases.186
The funds could also funnel into drug treatment and rehabilitation
programs, particularly given the recent opioid crisis plaguing the United
States.187 The federal government ignited the War on Drugs in a public
effort to prevent the spread of rampant addiction primarily among
youths.188 However, if the government and state agencies truly seek to
alleviate drug use, these entities should continue the Obama
Administration’s efforts to treat drug addiction medicinally rather than
criminally.189 In doing so, the government could use the funds obtained
from asset forfeiture programs to financially support programs that
actually help citizens break free from addiction and continue on to lead
healthier, more productive lives.
There is no single “right answer” to the question of where funds
derived from forfeitures should go, but any of these options could help
eliminate the profit-sharing system that currently exists. By removing the
incentive of profit from law enforcement, there is a greater chance that
183. This could occur either through a general restitution fund, which could fund state crime
victim compensation programs, or it could be used to pay restitution costs directly to a victim in
a criminal case.
184. H.B. 560, 52d Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2015).
185. Martin Kaste, New Mexico Ended Civil Asset Forfeiture. Why Then Is It Still
Happening?, NPR (June 7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/06/07/481058641/new-mexicoended-civil-asset-forfeiture-why-then-is-it-still-happening [https://perma.cc/MZF8-TTKC]
(describing an incident in which a woman’s car was still confiscated by the police without a
conviction).
186. Pimentel, supra note 154, at 554.
187. Haeyoun Park & Matthew Bloch, How the Epidemic of Drug Overdose Deaths Rippled
Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/01/07/
us/drug-overdose-deaths-in-the-us.html [https://perma.cc/CVZ6-ZY2N] (graphically tracking the
sharp increase in deaths due to opioid overdoses since 1999).
188. In The New Jim Crow, Alexander argued that the rhetoric surrounding the War on Drugs
was actually a racial conversation further marginalizing black and brown people. ALEXANDER,
supra note 153, at 58. This Note does not discount this valid proposition. Rather, this Note seeks
to use the federal government’s rhetoric against it, primarily in an effort to actually work towards
more effective drug interdiction.
189. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 150, at 1.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss6/6

26

Milliron: Addressing Due Process Concerns: Evaluating Proposals for Civil A

1405

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

public trust in officers would increase, while there would also be a lower
risk of officers using forfeiture to circumvent the due process rights of
citizens—either intentionally or unintentionally—to bring home a few
extra dollars.
CONCLUSION
Civil asset forfeiture is an unnatural amalgamation of criminal and
civil law. Although civil forfeiture can be used to punish individuals for
criminal acts,190 the high standard of due process protection does not
extend to individuals who attempt to contest civil forfeitures.
Additionally, law enforcement officers are incentivized to use this hybrid
prosecutorial tool to acquire assets because the officers benefit directly
from the assets. Thus, many individuals are unable to defend their
property or assert their innocent ownership over their property. Because
property can be an intimate and valuable extension of one’s self and
ability to survive,191 the impact of civil forfeiture can lead to devastating
consequences.
Justice Thomas has seemingly opened the door for further
conversation about the future of civil forfeiture and whether it can survive
under modern standards of practice.192 There are varied proposals for
ameliorating the harsh effects and injustices precipitated by civil
forfeitures. The only guaranteed solution to these problems is abolishing
civil forfeiture altogether; this would be possible by using only criminal
forfeiture, since the criminal context triggers the highest standards of
procedural due process. But other proposals may also have lasting effects
that could provide at least some due process protection for communities
most affected by forfeitures. Although a statutory change to raise the
burden of proof on the government offers the simplest solution, other
changes—especially when combined—like altering drug laws,
appointing counsel, and disincentivizing law enforcement can all have a
potentially lasting impact in protecting the due process rights of citizens.

190. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621 (1993).
191. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2 (1765) (“There
is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as
the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”).
192. Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 847 (2017).
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